FWA (Fake World Assets) — Risk Audit

Methodology

Manual source review (no automated tooling) of the verified Etherscan source of all 8 FWA contracts, reasoned to file:line against a Solidity review rubric (admin/ownership powers, upgradeability, custody, randomness integrity, reentrancy, economic traps, honeypot/transfer restrictions, event/error/storage patterns). Verified source wins over documentation. Live on-chain values cited are those recorded at state block 25762870 (docs/audits/fwa/fixtures/state-block-25762870.json). Non-proxy status confirmed via a zero EIP-1967 implementation slot on all 8 contracts; mutability is via owner setters only, no upgrade path. Companion recon: docs/research/2026-08-15-fwa-contract-recon.md.

Contracts in scope

• 0xB276…Ac1cExplorer ↗
• 0xa0Df…C845Explorer ↗
• 0x6a1a…fc78Explorer ↗
• 0xa084…5D9fExplorer ↗
• 0x2C67…6444Explorer ↗
• 0xd408…5655Explorer ↗
• 0x8543…17c3Explorer ↗
• 0x1C17…3BfeExplorer ↗

Findings

13 published findings

• FWA-01criticalAdmin Power· confirmed

  Single owner key controls every economic and trust parameter across all 8 contracts

  One key (0x019817aD…13e8Cb) is owner() of all 8 contracts and can retune essentially every economic parameter and several trust-critical pointers via explicit setters, with no timelock and unverified whether it is a multisig.

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• FWA-02highEconomic· confirmed

  Pull surcharge is deliberately uncapped

  setUint(SURCHARGE_BPS, x) accepts any value with no upper bound, so the owner can raise the pull price arbitrarily above the pool expected value.

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• FWA-03highRandomness· confirmed

  Owner-settable VRF coordinator and subscription id

  The randomness source (Chainlink VRF coordinator address) and subscription id are owner-mutable via setAddr/setUint, subject to a no-in-flight-requests guard.

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• FWA-04highCustody· confirmed

  FWARewards owner can drain the entire $FWA reward balance

  FWARewards.rescueTokens(to) transfers the module entire FWAToken balance to an arbitrary address, gated on FWA being in withdraw-only mode with zero unsettled acquisitions.

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• FWA-05highRug Vector· confirmed

  FWAClaim owner can drain the airdrop and reset the merkle root at will

  The airdrop contract lets the owner withdraw any token amount to any address at any time and change the merkle root with no timelock or finalization lock.

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• FWA-06mediumEconomic· confirmed

  Splitter owner can sweep all unclaimed holder ETH after one year

  After a fixed 365-day window the Splitter owner can transfer the entire contract balance — including unclaimed NFT-holder allocations — to themselves, permanently closing claims.

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• FWA-07mediumEconomic· confirmed

  retainedToProtocol toggle silently reassigns the sellback haircut

  An owner boolean decides whether the retained portion of a sellback becomes protocol revenue or is redistributed to depositors, without changing what the purchaser receives.

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• FWA-08mediumAdmin Power· confirmed

  FWAToken transfer-lock + owner buy-gate on the Uniswap-v4 pool

  $FWA is not a free-transfer ERC-20: peer-to-peer transfers between non-privileged addresses revert, and external buys on the v4 pool are gated off until the owner opens them. Sells are always allowed; there is no owner switch to freeze an existing holder exit.

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• FWA-09mediumRug Vector· confirmed

  Anyone can whitelist an arbitrary NFT collection by burning TTT

  The whitelist manager exposes a permissionless path: burning a fixed number of TTT NFTs whitelists any collection for deposits into FWA, gated only by burn cost and the owner reactive block.

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• FWA-10lowRandomness· confirmed

  Best-effort fast-path VRF callback self-call

  The VRF callback optionally makes one gas-bounded self-call to settle the canonical head immediately. It is failure-isolated and cannot roll back the cached word, so it is an optimization, not a reentrancy hole.

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• FWA-11lowCustody· confirmed

  Best-effort NFT delivery can leave an NFT recoverable-but-stuck

  On resolution, if the NFT collection reverts on transfer (pausable/non-standard), delivery is caught and the NFT is recorded as claimable later; the ETH legs still settle.

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• FWA-12informationalEconomic· confirmed

  FWAVRFService fee inputs are owner-set and unbounded; surplus can be starved

  The per-pull VRF service fee is computed from owner-set inputs with no lower bound (can be zero), and the processor-sponsorship surplus can be starved, but neither can stall pulls or drain callback-backing ETH.

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• FWA-13informationalAdmin Power· confirmed

  Codebase-wide error-handling deviates from the require(cond, Err()) standard

  Against the review rubric error-form requirement, the contracts predominantly use if (cond) revert CustomError() (and, in the hook, one revert string) rather than require(cond, CustomError()).

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